ABSTRACT We provide an overview of legal and technical concepts of privacy protection. Data protection guarantees exist in European Union at a primary law level since 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty has become effective. The new regulation called general data protection regulation adopted on April 27, 2016 will enter into effect on May 25, 2018. Regarding data protection, the US follows a very different approach. The cornerstone of the technical framework of data protection is the concept of differential privacy for which the privacy's provable guarantees hold even against worst-case scenarios when the access to arbitrary auxiliary information is provided. Research directions for integrating legal and technical concepts of privacy are discussed. Although both fields, legal and technical, approach privacy from different perspectives, we expect that these approaches will converge to a common framework. The privacy-preserving framework, therefore, should be a balance between: 1) ambiguous legal concepts and precise mathematical notions of privacy; 2) the desired privacy level; 3) the information loss, which is measured by data utility metrics; and 4) the complexity and the practical feasibility of the proposed technique. Key notions of fairness are incompatible with each other, and hence any privacy-preserving framework should also include the trade-offs between conditions imposed in the definitions of fairness. The complex assembly of legal and technical components implementing various privacy requirements in the privacy-preserving framework, should be realized within the privacy-by-design concept.
I. INTRODUCTION
ICT technologies are becoming ubiquitously embedded in our economies and societies, bringing both benefits and challenges. As ICT technologies move toward broader deployment, technical experts, policy analysts, and ethicists have raised concerns regarding unintended and undesired consequences of their widespread adoption. Experts forecast that rapid progress in the field of specialized artificial intelligence will continue, and that machines will reach and exceed human performance on more and more tasks. Large-scale user data available in social networks and the use of algorithms for consequential decisions about people, often replacing decisions made by human-driven bureaucratic processes, leads to concerns regarding citizens' privacy and how to ensure justice, fairness, and accountability of the deployed algorithms.
Every search on Google, every ''like'' on Facebook, everything we do both on and offline is stored and analyzed. While each piece of information is too weak to produce a reliable prediction, when tens, hundreds, or thousands of individual data are combined, the resulting predictions become more accurate. Recently, scholars have shown that easily accessible digital records of behavior, Facebook Likes, can be used to automatically and accurately predict a psychological profile of an individual (including: sexual orientation, ethnicity, religious and political views, personality traits, intelligence, happiness, use of addictive substances, parental separation, age, and gender [1] . These psychological profiles has be used in a political campaign for delivering targeted and highly persuasive messages to people on social media. There are ''somewhere close to four or five thousand data points on every individual'' in US resulting in models of ''personality of every adult across the United States, some 230 million people'', New York Times, Nov, 19, 2016 [2] . Epstein and Robertson [3] have presented evidence from five experiments in two countries (US and India) suggesting that biased search rankings, which can be masked so that people are not aware of the manipulation, can shift the voting preferences of undecided voters. The key finding of the recent report of Freedom House on ''Manipulating Social Media to Undermine Democracy'' includes [4] : ''Online manipulation and disinformation tactics played an important role in elections in at least 18 countries over the past year, including the United States.' ' One of the biggest concerns in our societies is privacy. Privacy has been identified as a key policy, regulatory and legislation challenge of the 21st century [5] - [7] . The concept of privacy [8] differs among cultures and individuals, but shares common themes. It has been a subject of intense philosophical, political, legal, and more recently technical research, yet there is no single definition or analysis or meaning of the term privacy [9] . Recognizing ''the right to be let alone'' Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in nineteenth century [10] were the first to discuss how to protect the privacy of the individual and to explain the nature and extent of that protection, by focusing in large part on the press and publicity allowed by nineteenth century inventions such as photography and newspapers. The scope of privacy has been extended to cover different aspects including control over information, human dignity, intimacy, and social relationships. Concerns over the accessibility and retention of electronic communications and the expansion of camera surveillance have led scholars to discuss privacy protection with respect to the society [8] , [11] , [12] . Data manipulation and unauthorized collection and use of personal data (for creating sophisticated models of user's personalities), raise ethical and privacy issues. Recent developments of ICT technologies and powerful artificial intelligence algorithms, go beyond the existing legal framework, so it is necessary to build new models that will focus on the responsibility of computer programs that increasingly make own decisions, and on the data privacy of citizens by regulating the unauthorized use of their personal data.
Contributions: In this article, we systematize the overwhelming complexity of the privacy concept with particular emphasis on its legal and technical characteristics. Our main contributions are:
• We overview legal framework for privacy protection.
In EU, data protection guarantees exist at a primary law level since 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty came into force, while the new regulation called General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) adopted on 27 April 2016 will enter into effect on 25 May 2018. EU law provides for a comprehensive data protection framework. We review basic concept of data protection including (1) Right to erasure ('right to be forgotten'), (2) Automated individual decision-making, including profiling, (3) Data protection by design and by default, and (4) Data protection impact assessment. The US, with its restrictions to the protection of the Fourth Amendment, through the Third Party Doctrine, and the exclusion of non-US persons from both the Fourth Amendment and the Privacy Act protection, follow a very different approach. We review recent discussions regarding the right to be forgotten.
• We overview technical framework for privacy protection. The cornerstone of this framework is the concept of differential privacy for which the privacy's provable guarantees hold even against worst case scenarios when the access to arbitrary auxiliary information is provided. We discuss several benefits of differential privacy including robustness to auxiliary information and preservation under post-processing, quantification of privacy loss, composition, and group privacy. Differential privacy has been deployed on a global scale. Systems implementing efficient differential privacy are designed and tested for stream processing, for computations on graphs, and for SQL Queries. Systems for enabling researches from different communities (having no expertise in privacy, computer science, or statistics) to share, analyze, or explore privacy sensitive datasets with the strong privacy protections of differential privacy have also been designed and deployed. We review various notions of algorithmic fairness.
• We discuss research directions for integrating legal and technical concepts of privacy. Although both fields, legal and technical, approach privacy from different perspectives, we expect that these approaches will converge to a common framework. The privacy-preserving framework, therefore, should be a balance between:
(1) ambiguous legal concepts and precise mathematical notions of privacy, (2) the desired privacy level, (3) the information loss, which is measured by data utility metrics, (4) the complexity and the practical feasibility of the proposed technique. Key notions of fairness are incompatible with each other, and hence any privacypreserving framework should also include the tradeoffs between conditions imposed in the definitions of fairness. The complex assembly of legal and technical components implementing various privacy requirements in the privacy-preserving framework, should be realized within the privacy-by-design concept.
II. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVACY PRESERVATION
The concept of privacy has broad usage in ordinary language as well as in a plethora of scientific disciplines ranging from philosophy to computer science, and from political science to legal discussions. This section reviews a privacy concept related to the control over information about oneself, also known as information privacy [9] . Information privacy concerns access to individually identifiable personal information and has been recently reviewed by Smith et al. [13] and Belanger and Crossler [14] . The definitional approaches can be broadly classified as either value-based or cognate-based. The value-based definitions can be further grouped into privacy as a right and privacy as a commodity. The notion of privacy as a commodity assume that privacy, although still an individual and societal value, is subject to the economic principles of cost-benefit analysis and trade-off at both individual and societal levels. The cognate-based definitions can be further classified into privacy as a state (of limited access to a person) and privacy as a control (the selective control of access to the self). We refer to [13] and [14] for in depth review on privacy research. Although the development of instruments to measure privacy concerns has gained a considerable emphasis, Pavlou [15] in the editorial accompanied those two reviews identified the ''need for more precise measurement of information privacy and more commonality in the methods used to capture information privacy''. This was addressed in [16] by providing a model of privacy concerns consisting of six dimensions: (1) Awareness that personal data is being collected and how it will be used; (2) Collection of personal data; (3) Control over the use of personal data; (4) Secondary use and sharing of personal data with other entities; (5) Protection of personal data from improper access; and (6) Errors in personal data and the ability to correct them. The information privacy has triggered various privacy protection legal systems: data privacy laws and bills exist in 120 counties [17] . Newman [18] and other scholars have argued that the United States (US) and multiple countries in Asia have developed a limited system of privacy protection that focuses on self-regulation within industry and government [9] . In contrast, the European Union (EU) and other counties have adopted an alternative vision stressing the individual privacy against the economic interests of firms and public officials [9] . This has resulted in the new regulation called General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) adopted on 27 April 2016, which will enter into effect on 25 May 2018 [19] . GDPR aims to ensure a harmonized and unified approach to the data protection of the data subjects (the EU-citizen) by providing control of the data subjects over their personal data and creating a sustainable approach to data protection laws all over the EU [20] . In the EU, data protection is a fundamental right, distinct from the right to privacy, and regulated by the Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [21] , which states: ''Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her'' (paragraph 1) and ''Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified'' (paragraph 2).
GDPR has emerged from 20th century concerns regarding big data, large scale records and databases tracking information about citizens, and serves to protect an individual's sphere of ''informational autonomy'' against such activity.
The text of the GDPR makes it clear that the EU intends to have greater extraterritorial effect. The GDPR anticipates effective protection of data subjects' rights in a digitalized and globalized world, while at the same time allowing the processing of personal data, including sensitive data, for scientific research. GDPR sets an important precedent: its success, or failure, will have repercussions that extend well beyond Europe. The GDPR's objective is to establish a uniform legal framework for the protection of personal data in the EU member states and equal competitive conditions for the processing of personal data. To help find a common solution to the danger of personal data abuse, not only from humans, but also from the machines which are aware of and able to act upon its surroundings and which can make decisions.
GDPR applies to any business, regardless of which region of the world is, that offer goods or services (even for free) to individuals in the EU or that monitors individuals located in the EU. For all the demands that it will make on resources through the preparation and implementation periods, GDPR should be still be seen as a positive step for businesses. If a business is not in the EU, they will still have to comply with the Regulation. Non-EU controllers and processors who deal with EU subjects' personal data must comply with the new Regulation. Although enforcing regulation beyond EU borders will be a challenge, those providing products or services to EU customers, or processing their data, will face sanction under the Regulation if an incident is reported. In Germany, for example, the government has drafted a law that would fine social networks up to 50 million euro for failing to remove fake news or hate speech.
A large number of laws, regulations, ethical codes, institutional policies, contracts, and best practices has emerged to address privacy concerns, resulting in data privacy laws and bills which exist in 120 counties [17] . This section aims to provide overview of basic principles on which these laws and regulations have been proposed by considering in more detail GDPR as an example. We first provide some of the key terms defined in the Article 4 Definitions of GDPR [19] :
• 'personal data' means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person;
• 'processing' means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction; VOLUME 6, 2018
• 'profiling' means any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person's performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements;
• 'pseudonymisation' means the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person;
• 'controller' means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of such processing are determined by Union or Member State law, the controller or the specific criteria for its nomination may be provided for by Union or Member State law;
• 'processor' means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes personal data on behalf of the controller;
• 'recipient' means a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or another body, to which the personal data are disclosed, whether a third party or not. However, public authorities which may receive personal data in the framework of a particular inquiry in accordance with Union or Member State law shall not be regarded as recipients; the processing of those data by those public authorities shall be in compliance with the applicable data protection rules according to the purposes of the processing;
• 'consent' of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her. Principles relating to processing of personal data, which are described in the Article 6 of GDPR, include lawfulness, fairness and transparency (paragraph 1); purpose limitation (paragraph 2); data minimization (paragraph3); accuracy (paragraph 4); storage limitation (paragraph 5); and integrity and confidentiality (paragraph 6). The principles of lawfulness and transparency are further detailed in the Article 7 and Article 12 of GDPR, respectively. For example, the lawful bases for processing data, described in the Article 7 of GDPR, are: ''(a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child.'' However, the principle of fairness has not been detailed in the GDPR; in particular, specific measures for ensuring fair processing are not specified, how fairness can be achieved in automated decision making is not provided, and so on.
GDPR also introduces a right to an explanation, stated as such in Recital 71: ''. . . such processing should be subject to suitable safeguards, which should include specific information to the data subject and the right to obtain human intervention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision''. However, the right to an explanation is not mentioned in the binding articles of the text (as recitals are not binding), having been removed during the legislative process [22] , [23] . The Article 15 addresses the ''right of access by the data subject''. The data subject has right to obtain from the controller confirmation as to whether or not personal data concerning him or her are being processed, and access to the personal data and the information for ''the purposes of the processing; the categories of personal data concerned; the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed'', including information regarding ''the existence of automated decision-making, including profiling, . . . meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject''.
Edwards and Veale [23] argue that ''the search for a 'right to an explanation' in the GDPR may be at best distracting, and at worst nurture a new kind of 'transparency fallacy'.'' However, they also argue that other parts of the GDPR such as the right to erasure and privacy by design ''may have the seeds we can use to make algorithms more responsible, explicable, and human-centered''. The remaining part of this section summarizes four concepts related to privacy: (1) Right to erasure ('right to be forgotten'), (2) Automated individual decision-making, including profiling, (3) Data protection by design and by default, and (4) Data protection impact assessment.
A. RIGHT TO ERASURE ('RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN')
The concept of 'right to be forgotten' refers to the right individuals have to request their data (collected by others) be deleted [24] . In the era of Big Data and the Internet, as more data about individuals are being collected, aggregated, analyzed, and are on disposal to everyone, citizens' concerns about privacy have also been raised. Recent surveys found that 88% of Americans [25] and 75% citizens of EU [26] supported a legal initiative mandating a right to delete their personal information that was collected and stored by organizations. In 2014 the European Union Court of Justice ruled that Google had to provide some form of a right to be forgotten to European consumers [27] . In the USA, California passed a law (SB 568) that provides a limited form of a right to be forgotten to minors [28] .
Article 17 Right to erasure ('right to be forgotten') states: ''The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies: (a) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed; (b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based'' on a given consent for a specific purpose, or on a given explicit consent for special categories of data, and ''where there is no other legal ground for the processing; (c) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant'' his/her right to object ''and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the processing'' for direct marketing purposes; ''(d) the personal data have been unlawfully processed; (e) the personal data have to be erased for compliance with a legal obligation in Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject; (f) the personal data have been collected in relation to the offer of information society services referred to'' a child.
The GPDR states exceptions for such deletion including the exercise of the freedom of expression and information; when the data in question is processed due to a legal obligation under the EU or Member State law; for reasons of public interest in the area of public health, public interest, scientific, historical research or statistical purposes which would be rendered practically impossible to achieve their objectives without the processing of this data; or when such processing involves the establishment or defense of legal claims.
There are already some notable concerns with the Article 17 both legal and technical. As already discussed, the right to be forgotten entered the public awareness in the United States through the 2014 European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision in Google v. Spain. In the year following the ECJ's decision, Google received 905000 requests to have links removed from search engine results, of which about 41 percent were approved by Google [29] . Some scholars decry the violation of free expression and highlight the censorship implicit within the right to be forgotten. Cunningham [30] concludes that ''European filtering of Internet content worldwide through the right to be forgotten . . . effectuates international censorship in the guise of privacy . . . ''. Recently, Cunningham [31] suggests that ''European policymakers failed to conform their privacy law to the Internet's architecture'' by failing ''to account for the borderless flow of information . . . ''. As soon as a data is removed from Google search, the same data is added back on the Internet through alternative avenues. On these concerns, the European Commission argues that the right to be forgotten is about protecting the privacy of the individuals not about erasing past events or restricting freedom of press: ''The proposed provisions on the right to be forgotten are very clear: freedom of expression, as well as historical and scientific research are safeguarded'' [32] . Finally as a technical concern, Fosch et al. [33] explore whether the right to be forgotten is practicable or beneficial in a computer science (machine learning/artificial intelligence) context concluding that it may be impossible to fulfill its legal aims in computer science environments.
B. AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, INCLUDING PROFILING
Regulation of 'automated decisions' was addressed explicitly in the 1995 Data Protection Directive (DPD), however, the GDPR extends the protection against decisions made solely on the basis of automated processing to cover not only profiling of data subjects but also any other form of automated processing. Article 22(1) of the GDPR gives data subject ''the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.'' In terms of lawfulness, Article 22(2) of the GDPR does contain some specific exemptions when the Article 22(1) shall not apply: ''if the decision (a) is necessary for entering into, or performance of, a contract between the data subject and a data controller; (b) is authorised by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject and which also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests; or (c) is based on the data subject's explicit consent''.
Article 22 (3) states that ''in the cases referred to in points (a) and (c) of paragraph 2, the data controller shall implement suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest the decision''. However, how a decision can be contested depends on whether the safeguards in Article 22(3) (i.e. rights to obtain human intervention, express views, and contest the decision) are interpreted as a unit that must be invoked together, or as individual rights that can be invoked separately or in any possible combination. Different possible models for contesting an automated decision were assessed in [34] . Article 22(4) addresses specifics when processing special categories of personal data as described in Article 9 of GDPR. Article 22 (4) states that ''decisions referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be based on special categories of personal data . . . and suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests are in place.' ' The GDPR contains transparency mechanisms (Art 12), notification duties (Articles 13 and 14), and the right of access (Article 15), all of which create informational requirements concerning automated decision-making. Article 12 (7) requires that the information to be provided to data subjects may be provided ''to give in an easily visible, intelligible and clearly legible manner a meaningful overview of the intended processing'', including ''the existence of automated decisionmaking, including profiling, referred to in Article 22 (1) and (4) and, at least in those cases, meaningful information about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.'' (Article 13(2f), Article 14 (2g), and Article 15(1h)). Two requirements are notable: (1) that the information provided must be meaningful to its recipient and broad in scope (a 'meaningful overview'), and (2) that the notification occurs prior to processing ('intended processing'). Article 12 (1) stresses that ''the controller shall take appropriate measures to provide any information referred to in Articles 13 and 14 and any communication under Articles 15 to 22 and 34 relating to processing to the data subject in a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language, in particular for any information addressed specifically to a child.'' In describing information to be provided about automated decision-making, Articles 13 -15 explicitly refer only to Article 22(1) and Article 22(4), but not to the Article 22(3), which implies that data subjects do not need to be informed about the safeguards against automated decisionmaking such as the right to contest (Article 22 (3)). Therefore, the data subject remains responsible to exercise his/her rights independently.
C. DATA PROTECTION BY DESIGN AND BY DEFAULT
The concept privacy by design integrates legal and technical components within a holistic framework by considering privacy throughout the whole process of data protection. It enhances the value of privacy as a human right and provides mechanisms to ensure digital technology within the parameters of user control. The concept originates in a joint report on ''Privacy-enhancing technologies'' by a joint team of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, Canada, the Dutch Data Protection Authority and the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research in 1995 [35] . It is based on seven fundamental principles [36] : (1) Proactive not Reactive; Preventative not Remedial (aiming to prevent privacy infractions from occurring); (2) Privacy as the Default Setting; (3) Privacy Embedded into Design (so that privacy becomes an essential component of the core functionality being delivered); (4) Full Functionality -Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum (aiming to accommodate all legitimate interests and objectives in a positive-sum ''win-win'' manner); (5) End-to-End Security -Full Lifecycle Protection; (6) Visibility and Transparency -Keep it Open; and (7) Respect for User Privacy -Keep it User-Centric.
The concept of Privacy by Design aims to provide data protection by design and to enable service without data control transfer from citizens to controllers or processors s the system (the citizen become recognizable). In regulatory terms it is referenced in EU Data Protection Regulation GDPR Article 25: Data protection by design and by default. Article 25 (1) suggests appropriate technical and organizational measures to be implemented for data protection. More specifically, it states: Taking into account the state of the art, the cost of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for rights and freedoms of natural persons posed by the processing, the controller shall, both at the time of the determination of the means for processing and at the time of the processing itself, implement appropriate technical and organisational measures, such as pseudonymisation, which are designed to implement data-protection principles, such as data minimisation, in an effective manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the requirements of this Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects. Further, Article 25(2) states: The controller shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, such measures shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible without the individual's intervention to an indefinite number of natural persons. Finally, the certification mechanism in accordance with the Article 42: Certification, may be used as an element to demonstrate compliance with the requirements set out in Article 25(1) and Article 25(2).
D. DATA PROTECTION IMPACT ASSESSMENT
A Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) is a type of impact assessment conducted by an organization with access to a large amount of sensitive, private data about individuals in or flowing through its system. Various PIA approaches have been developed in many governmental organizations such as those in, for example, USA [37] , UK [38] , and France [39] . The PIA is defined as [37] ''an analysis of how personally identifiable information is collected, used, disseminated, and maintained. . . . It examines how the Department has incorporated privacy concerns throughout the development, design, and deployment of a technology or rulemaking. . . . The purpose of a PIA is to demonstrate that program managers and system owners have consciously incorporated privacy protections throughout the development life cycle of a system or program. This involves making certain that privacy protections are built into the system from the initiation of development, not after the fact when they can be far more costly or could affect the viability of the project.''
The obligation to complete a PIA is provided in Article 35: Data protection impact assessment of the GDPR. Data protection impact assessment (DPIA) has to be carried out according to Article 35(1) GDPR which states: ''Where a type of processing in particular using new technologies, and taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing, is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller shall, prior to the processing, carry out an assessment of the impact of the envisaged processing operations on the protection of personal data. A single assessment may address a set of similar processing operations that present similar high risks.'' Paragraph 2 specifies that ''the controller shall seek the advice of the data protection officer, where designated, when carrying out a data protection impact assessment''. Paragraph 3 lists examples when impact assessment referred to in paragraph 1 shall in particular be required: ''(a) a systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects relating to natural persons which is based on automated processing, including profiling, and on which decisions are based that produce legal effects concerning the natural person or similarly significantly affect the natural person; (b) processing on a large scale of special categories of data referred to in Article 9(1), or of personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences referred to in Article 10; or (c) a systematic monitoring of a publicly accessible area on a large scale.''
The GDPR provides a minimum standard for carrying out a DPIA, as stipulated by Article 35 (7): ''The assessment shall contain at least: (a) a systematic description of the envisaged processing operations and the purposes of the processing, including, where applicable, the legitimate interest pursued by the controller; (b) an assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the processing operations in relation to the purposes; (c) an assessment of the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects referred to in paragraph 1; and (d) the measures envisaged to address the risks, including safeguards, security measures and mechanisms to ensure the protection of personal data and to demonstrate compliance with this Regulation taking into account the rights and legitimate interests of data subjects and other persons concerned.'' Moreover, the controller must involve data subjects in the process where appropriate and give the persons concerned a chance to express their views on the intended processing, as stated in the Article 35(9): ''Where appropriate, the controller shall seek the views of data subjects or their representatives on the intended processing, without prejudice to the protection of commercial or public interests or the security of processing operations.'' Finally, Article 35(11) states: ''Where necessary, the controller shall carry out a review to assess if processing is performed in accordance with the data protection impact assessment at least when there is a change of the risk represented by processing operations.''
III. TECHNICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVACY
Privacy research as an engineering discipline has been shaped largely by the Internet, big data and recent developments in computer science, in particular in cryptography, machine learning and artificial intelligence. This has triggered the development of methods and techniques for extracting knowledge from data while preserving privacy, which are encompassed in a field known as privacy-preserving data mining. In-depth description of techniques, metrics, and specific applications in privacy-preserving data mining can be found in [40] and [41] . Moreover, privacy enhancing technologies have also been playing an important role in the discussions on privacy and data protection. These technologies focus on practical solutions, that is, software and hardware systems ''encompassing technical processes, methods, or knowledge to achieve specific privacy or data protection functionality or to protect against risks to privacy of an individual or a group of natural persons'' [42] . A recent report has suggested a methodology for comparing different privacy enhancing technologies with regard to their maturity (their technology readiness and their quality concerning the provided privacy notion) [42] . In general maturity level of privacy and data protection domain is lower comparing to the security domain. This section overviews two central concepts in privacy-preserving data mining, the concepts of privacy and fairness, both having a solid mathematical foundation.
A. PRIVACY
Methods for privacy-preserving data mining [43] are designed to guarantee a certain level of privacy achieved through data modification and to maximize data utility, so that data mining can still be efficiently implemented on the transformed data. When data collections are released either publicly or to third parties for data analysis without disclosing the ownership of the sensitive data, preservation of privacy may be achieved by anonymizing the records before publishing. It has been documented that removing attributes that explicitly identify users does not imply anonymization. Indeed, a person may still be identified by pseudo or quasiidentifiers and by sensitive attributes. A quasi-identifier is a set of non-sensitive attributes that do not explicitly identify a person, but can be combined with other data to de-anonymize the person. Sensitive attributes are person-specific private attributes that should not be publicly disclosed, and that may be also linked to identify individuals. Data anonymization can be achieved by applying privacy models that alter the original data in order to prevent information disclosure. There are two major research branches in privacy: group anonymization privacy models and differential privacy models.
Group anonymization privacy models include k-anonymity privacy model, l-diversity privacy model, and t-closeness privacy model. The k-anonymity model, proposed by [44] , assumes that the identifiable attributes of a data record are undistinguishable from at least other k − 1 records. In other words, with a k-anonymized dataset, one could not identify the identity of a single record since other k −1 similar records exist. In the k-anonymity model, the value k may be used as a measure of privacy: the higher the value of k, the harder it is to de-anonymize records. The set of k records is known as equivalence class. The probability of de-anonymizing a record is 1/k. However, larger k reduces the utility of the data. Some of the advantages of the k-anonymity privacy model include the simplicity of definition and the great amount of existing algorithms. Nevertheless, this privacy model has two major problems. The first problem has to do with the consideration that each record represents a unique individual, or in other words, that each represented individual has one, and only one record. If this is not the case, an equivalence class with k records does not necessarily link to k different individuals. The second problem relates to the fact that sensitive attributes are not taken into consideration when forming the k-anonymized dataset. Machanavajjhala et al. [45] expand the k-anonymity model by assuming that the equivalence class obeys the l-diversity principle. An l-diverse equivalence class is a set of entries such that at least l distinct values in an equivalence class exist for the sensitive attributes. The l-diversity model increases the diversity of sensitive values within equivalence classes. Li et al. [46] suggest a privacy model, called t-closeness privacy model, in which the distance between the distribution of a sensitive attribute in the original table and the distribution of the same attribute in any equivalence class is less or eq ual to t (t-closeness principle).
A variety of privacy guarantees has been introduced over the years, including just mentioned group anonymization privacy models; although these models are less restrictive than differential privacy, they have been shown to be vulnerable to certain attacks [47] - [49] . In the next subsection, we will overview the concept of differential privacy for which the privacy's provable guarantees hold even against worst case attackers with access to arbitrary auxiliary information.
B. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Differential privacy is a concept for quantifying and managing privacy. Since the work of Dwork [50] and Dwork et al. [51] , it has become a topic of intense interest in the algorithms community, with applications ranging from data mining and medical research [52] , [53] to collecting browser statistics in a deployed system at Google [54] , [55] . Differential privacy ensures that the removal or addition of a single database item does not (substantially) affect the outcome of any analysis. In another words, ''the risk to one's privacy . . . should not substantially increase as a result of participating in a statistical database'' [50] .
Differential privacy is primarily studied in the context of the collection, analysis, and release of aggregate statistics. It allows general statistical analysis of data while protecting data about individuals with a strong formal guarantee of privacy. As the theory is to some extend subtle and typically requires expert training to put into practice correctly, researchers have created a number of tools to assist nonexperts in using it. Dwork et al. [51] propose the -differential privacy model that ensures that a single record (a record of a person) does not considerably affect the outcome of the analysis over the dataset. Therefore, a privacy of the person is not affected by participating in the data collection since the person record does not influence, adjustable through the value of , significantly the final outcome. A statistical interpretation of differential privacy is suggested in [56] , differential identifiability is proposed in [57] , membership privacy is introduced in [58] while a framework for adaptive differential privacy has been recently proposed in [59] . For in-depth analysis of differential privacy, we refer the interested reader to several recent monographs and tutorials [60] - [63] .
We now provide a formal definition of differential privacy. Differential privacy is a property of a procedure or mechanism M that takes a sensitive dataset D and releases the output M(D). The mechanism is a randomized algorithm mapping datasets to an arbitrary set of outputs. Let D be an arbitrary dataset. Then, M(D) yields a probability distribution on the range of M. A database is modeled as a collection of rows, with each row containing the data of a different individual. We concentrate on pairs of databases (D, D ) differing only in one row: both pairs of databases are of the same size, say, n, such that they agree on n − 1 rows but one row in D has been replaced, in D , by another row. Differential privacy is a formal concept for protecting individual level privacy in statistical data analysis. In its simplest form, (pure) differential privacy is parameterized by a real number > 0, which controls how much ''privacy loss'' an individual can suffer when a computation (i.e., a statistical data analysis task) is performed involving his or her data.
Definition ( -Differential Privacy):
A randomized mechanism M gives ( , 0)-differential privacy if for all data sets D and D differing on at most one row, and all S ⊆ Range(M),
where the probability space in each case is over the coin flips of M.
This is a powerful notion of privacy: if a person A cannot tell whether or not the database contains data of a person B, then A cannot learn anything about B's data. Consider any possible set S of outputs that the mechanism might produce. Then the probability that the mechanism produces an output in S is within the e factor on any pair of adjacent databases. In another words, from the output produced by M, it is hard to tell whether the database is D that contains data of the person B, or the adjacent database D which does not contain data of the person B. Differential Privacy is a notion of algorithmic stability: informally, it requires that small changes to the input of an algorithm induce only small changes to the distribution of its outputs.
Differential privacy offers several benefits which will be briefly described now.
• Robustness to auxiliary information and preservation under post-processing. -Differential privacy guarantees are independent of any auxiliary information (other databases, newspapers, websites, and so on) known to an adversary and of observers' prior knowledge, including knowledge about other records in the database. Moreover, when differential privacy is imposed on analysis output, all further processing (including joint computations over outputs of other analysis) do not weaken the guarantees of differential privacy.
• Quantification of Privacy Loss. -Differential privacy is quantified by the maximum, over all C ⊆ Range(M), and all adjacent databases D, D , of the ratio
In particular, ( , 0)-differential privacy ensures that this privacy loss is bounded by . This quantification permits comparison of algorithms: given two algorithms with the same degree of accuracy (quality of responses), which one incurs smaller privacy loss?
• Composition. -Given two differentially private computations, on the same or on different, possibly overlapping, databases, where one is ( 1 , 0)-differentially private and the other is ( 2 , 0)-differentially private, the cumulative privacy loss incurred by participating in (or opting out of) (both) database(s) is at worst 1 + 2 . This property enables the construction of differentially private programming platforms [54] , [55] , [64] - [66] .
• Group Privacy. -Every ( , 0)-differentially private algorithm is automatically (k , 0)-differentially private for groups of size k, for all k. A relaxation of differential privacy is approximate or ( , δ)-differential privacy [67] , which essentially guarantees that the probability that any individual suffers privacy loss exceeding is bounded by δ. For sufficiently small δ, approximate ( , δ)-differential privacy provides a comparable standard of privacy protection as pure -differential privacy, while often permitting substantially more useful analyses to be performed.
Definition (( , δ)-Differential Privacy):
A randomized mechanism M gives ( , δ)-differential privacy if for all data sets D and D differing on at most one row, and all S ⊆ Range(M),
Dwork and Rothblum [68] recently suggest a different relaxation of differential privacy called concentrated differential privacy, see also [69] . A randomized mechanism satisfies concentrated differentially privacy if the privacy loss has small mean and is sub-Gaussian. Concentrated differential privacy behaves in a qualitatively similar way as approximate ( , δ)-differential privacy under composition. However, it permits sharper analyses of basic computational tasks, including a tight analysis of the aforementioned Gaussian mechanism.
There exist several privacy-preserving analysis tools which bring differential privacy to practice [70] - [73] . They can be partitioned into the following categories [74] : (a) Programming languages and systems: here the goal is to make it easier for users to write programs that are guaranteed to be differentially private, either by composition of differentially private building blocks or by formal verification from scratch; (b) Optimization for specific data releases: here the goal is to optimize the choice of differentially private algorithms and the partitioning of the privacy budget to maximize utility for the particular data source; (c) Optimization and evaluation of specific algorithms: here the goal is to design differentially private algorithms for specific data analysis tasks, including substantial experimental work on comparing and optimizing such algorithms across a wide range of datasets. PSI (''a Private data Sharing Interface'') [74] is a system developed for enabling researchers to share and explore privacy sensitive datasets with the strong privacy protections of differential privacy. Adaptive Fuzz [59] is a system for supporting advanced parameter-adaptive composition using filters.
As the concept of differential privacy has recently been introduced into Apple's iOS 10 (2016) [75] and Google's Chrome browser (2014) [54] , the process of privacy's deployment has started on a global scale. Since 2014, RAPPOR [54] has processed up to billions of daily, randomized reports in a manner that guarantees local differential privacy, without assumptions about users' trust. Recently, Google announced improved version of RAPPOR, the system PROCHLO, which enables any high-utility analysis algorithm to be compatible with strong privacy guarantees [55] . It is based on a principled systems architecture -Encode, Shuffle, Analyze (ESA) -for performing the large-scale monitoring of computer users' software activities with high utility while also protecting user privacy. Systems implementing efficient differential privacy are deployed and tested for stream processing [64] , for performing computations on graphs that are physically distributed across many participants [65] , and for SQL Queries [66] .
C. FAIRNESS
Fairness-aware data mining aims to address the concerns related to big data analytics that can cause societal harm by preventing marginalized groups to a certain right. Scholars have recently provided various definitions of algorithmic fairness [76] - [85] .
The concept of fairness is captured by the principle that similarly situated people are given similar treatment: any two individuals who are similar with respect to a particular task should be classified similarly. Thus, a fair algorithm (classifier) will give similar participants a similar probability of receiving each possible outcome. This is an individual-based fairness introduced by Dwork et al. [76] , which is centered on the notion of a task-specific similarity metric describing the extent to which pairs of individuals should be regarded as similar for the classification task at hand. The concern that machine learning algorithms can be discriminatory through feature selection has been recently addressed with the concept of group fairness. The key question renders to how to use a sensitive attribute such as gender or race to maximize fairness and accuracy, assuming that it is legal and ethical. Group fairness has a variety of definitions, including conditions of statistical parity, class balance and calibration. In contrast to individual fairness, these conditions constrain, in various ways, the dependence of the model (classifier) on the sensitive attributes. Recently, Dwork et al. [86] provide a simple and efficient decoupling technique for addressing sensitive attributes, which can be added on top of any blackbox machine learning algorithm. A different way to define fairness is to say that an algorithm's outcome does not allow predicting whether the subject was a member of a protected VOLUME 6, 2018 group or not. Thus, fairness can be seen as a form of information hiding requirement similar to privacy. Indeed, Dwork et al. [76] , have shown that the definition of fairness is a generalization of the notion of differential privacy.
Kleinberg et al. [80] discusses three conditions for a probabilistic classification to be fair to different groups: calibration within groups, balance for the negative class, and balance for the negative class that, all of them, have been proposed as versions of fairness. Following Kleinberg et al. [80] , let us consider a classification problem within a set of people. Each person represents either a positive instance or a negative instance of the classification problem. The positive class consists of the people who constitute positive instances, and the negative class consists of the people who constitute negative instances. Further, each person belongs to one of two groups, labeled 1 or 2, and has an associated feature vector σ , representing the person's data. Let p σ denote the fraction of people with feature vector σ who belong to the positive class. A person of group t has a probability a tσ of exhibiting the feature vector σ . Note that people of each group have the same probability p σ of belonging to the positive class provided their feature vector is σ .
An instance of the problem is specified by two parameters: a feature vector and a group for each person, with a value p σ for each feature vector, and distributions {a tσ } giving the frequency of the feature vectors in each group. A risk assignment is defined as to consist of a set of ''bins'' such that each bin is labeled with a score v b -the probability for everyone assigned to bin b. A rule for assigning people to bins is based on their feature vector σ and is specified by values X σ b , representing a fraction X σ b of all people with feature vector σ that are assigned to the bin b. Kleinberg et al. consider three conditions for fairness:
• Calibration within groups requires that for each group t, and each bin b with associated score v b , the expected number of people from group t in b who belong to the positive class should be a v b fraction of the expected number of people from group t assigned to b.
• Balance for the negative class requires that the average score assigned to people of group 1 who belong to the negative class should be the same as the average score assigned to people of group 2 who belong to the negative class.
• Balance for the positive class symmetrically requires that the average score assigned to people of group 1 who belong to the positive class should be the same as the average score assigned to people of group 2 who belong to the positive class. The first condition (calibration within groups) ensures treating people with the same score comparably with respect to the outcome to be justified. The second and third conditions provide that if two individuals in different groups exhibit comparable behavior (negative or positive), they should be treated comparably by the procedure. The notion of fairness in Dwork et al. [76] is a stronger than the definitions used in Kleinberg et al. [80] , however, balance conditions for the positive and negative classes discussed in Kleinberg et al. [80] reflect the notion that similar people should be treated similarly. Kleinberg et al. [80] show that the three notions of fairness are incompatible with each other; in another words, there is no method that can satisfy these three conditions simultaneously. This result is quite general and it can be phrased in terms in a number of domains where the trade-offs among these conditions do not appear to be wellunderstood. Kleinberg et al. [80] illustrate this with the following example: ''Suppose we want to determine the risk that a person is a carrier for a disease X, and suppose that a higher fraction of women than men are carriers. Then our results imply that in any test designed to estimate the probability that someone is a carrier of X, at least one of the following undesirable properties must hold: (a) the test's probability estimates are systematically skewed upward or downward for at least one gender; or (b) the test assigns a higher average risk estimate to healthy people (non-carriers) in one gender than the other; or (c) the test assigns a higher average risk estimate to carriers of the disease in one gender than the other. The point is that this trade-off among (a), (b), and (c) is not a fact about medicine; it is simply a fact about risk estimates when the base rates differ between two groups''.
IV. INTEGRATING TECHNICAL AND LEGAL CONCEPTS
Privacy concerns for the past 30 years have triggered intensive legal as well as technical research and practical measures and activities. A large number of laws, regulations, ethical codes, institutional policies, contracts, and best practices, as well as scientific articles has emerged to address legal and ethical aspects of privacy. Statisticians, applied mathematicians, and computer scientists have proposed a plethora of technical measures, tools, and methods, for disclosing data while protecting the privacy of individuals. Both fields, legal and technical, however, approach privacy from different perspectives.
Not only that public opinions and social norms cannot be precisely specified, laws are very often ambiguous, leaving details, or sometimes even major concepts, open to interpretation [87] . Some counties, including the United States, have a long history of dealing with these ambiguities through afterthe-fact oversight by the courts. Legal and/or policy rules are open to interpretation with details filled in through disputes, which are resolved after-the-fact and provide coherent detail for specific cases. Therefore, although lows and regulations have specific and detailed language, they are expected to be interpreted through cases, forming binding precedents, which, in a country law system, are as authoritative source of law as other legal documents [87] . This is true for privacy laws and regulations as well: many legal standards for privacy protection are open to interpretation and therefore require a case-specific legal analysis by attorneys. Moreover, privacy concepts in laws, regulations, and policies may differ significantly from those underlying privacy concepts in computer sciences: they are not precisely defined and they do not perfectly match definitions of privacy in computer sciences. In addition, as ''privacy laws are often sector-, jurisdiction-, and context-specific, different legal requirements apply depending on the setting, leading to different requirements for various datasets held by a single institution, or different requirements for the same or similar datasets held by different institutions'' [88] .
Privacy-preserving data mining methods and techniques are designed to guarantee a certain level of privacy and to maximize data utility [41] . Statistical Disclosure Limitation (SDL) refers to the broad set of techniques used to protect confidentiality of statistical data, i.e., fulfilling an obligation to data providers not to transmit their information to an unauthorized party. The methods of statistical disclosure limitation are already in widespread use by government statistical agencies throughout the world. For an overview of traditional SDL techniques, see [89] . In particular, census data released by most developed countries are protected using these methods [90] . Differential privacy, which is primarily studied in the context of the collection, analysis, and release of aggregate statistics, has recently emerged as a novel approach to privacy. It can be used to analyze and share data, while providing strong mathematical guarantees of privacy protection for research subjects. However, differential privacy is a young field and there are still a tremendous work to be done to address some implementation aspects of differential privacy. In the recent report on ''Privacy-Preserving Data Analysis for the Federal Statistical Agencies'', the authors conclude: ''To use formal privacy-preserving disclosure limitation methods for the 2020 Census, the methods must be developed, tested, and subjected to scientific scrutiny before the conclusion of the 2018 End-to-end test (roughly, February 2019)'' [91] .
The most common presentation of differential privacy assumes two classes of actors: curators, responsible for protecting the privacy of some sensitive database, and analysts aiming to extract information from this database. Curator evaluate probabilistic functions and return their (sampled) results. Each of these functions must be ( , δ)-differentially private, where the parameters and δ quantify the amount of privacy lost when running this function. For each new function proposed by the analyst, the curator must decide whether the aggregate privacy loss resulting from answering this function together with the already-released results of previous functions will exceed a global privacy budget ( g , δ g ) associated with the database. The differential privacy literature provides many tools for addressing this problem, ranging from simple [51] to sophisticated [92] , [93] , each with its own strengths and weaknesses [59] . However, ''how will that budget be distributed across the competing interests of accuracy for legislative redistricting (detail at small geographic levels-census blocks) versus data on small subpopulations (detail on many ethnic and racial minorities)?'' [91] . This is the central question yet to be addressed.
The Fundamental Law of Information Recovery states, informally, that ''overly accurate estimates of too many statistics completely destroys privacy'' [91] , [94] , [95] . As a consequence, the confidential data may be vulnerable to database reconstruction based entirely on the data published by a statistical agency. Differential privacy is designed to address the fundamental law of information recovery. By appropriate choice of the privacy budget, it is possible to stay within the bounds of the fundamental law while releasing any given number of estimated statistics. Therefore, ''the most pressing immediate problem for any statistical agency is how to modernize its disclosure limitation methods in light of the Fundamental Law'' [91] . Moreover, advances in statistics, machine learning and social network analysis, have shown that their methods can be used to infer undisclosed attributes of a person based on the disclosed attributes of others [96] . Barocas and Nissenbaum call this the tyranny of the minority ''because it is a choice forced upon the majority by a consenting minority'' [96] . The Article 22(1) of the GDPR aims at addressing this concern by giving data subject ''the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.'' However, the terms 'legal effects' and 'significantly affects' are open to interpretation and shall be resolved when considering specific cases.
The discussions regarding privacy in the previous sections suggests that any privacy-preserving framework should be a balance between: (1) the desired privacy level, (2) the information loss, which is measured by data utility metrics, (3) the complexity and the practical feasibility of the proposed technique. The framework should also include two interrelated trade-offs that influence an individual's information disclosure behavior: the trade-off between expected benefits and privacy risks and the trade-off between privacy risks and efficacy of coping mechanisms [97] . The information disclosure behavior of a person is influenced by three factors: the type of collected data, the purpose of data collection and usage, and the organization (or the person) collecting and using the data. Although there is unambiguous legal definition of what personal data is (e.g. in the General Data Protection Regulation of the EU and in US privacy law), the term personal data is not considered distinctively among users (individuals). Moreover, people evaluate the purpose of data being collected and value the benefits that providing their data may offer them [98] . Results in Kleinberg et al. [80] suggest that the key notions of fairness are incompatible with each other, and hence any privacy-preserving framework should also include the trade-offs between conditions imposed in the definitions of privacy and fairness.
One of the main challenges for implementing privacypreserving solutions, is addressing the fact the privacy is a subjective concept due to a person's own privacy comprehension, beliefs and risk assertions. Therefore, the concept of personalized privacy [41] empowering users to have a level of control over the specificity of their data, could be developed and deployed in various ICT solutions. Two concerns should be addressed when developing the concept of personalized privacy. The first reflects so called privacy paradox: claiming to have privacy concerns but disclosing private information nonetheless [99] , [100] . A personalized privacy solution empowers a user with data control, however, this could lead to undesirable outcomes (including security breaches, privacy invasions, and regrettable disclosures), especially when the person is unaware of the privacy risks related to data disclosure. Creating privacy awareness in combination with tools that support a user's privacy decisions should help this paradoxical behavior to be avoided. The second concern is related to the fact that a user does not have access to the overall distribution of sensitive values implying more protective decisions over her/his data and, thus, decreasing data utility [101] .
Another term related to ubiquitous computing [102] is context-aware privacy, which is achieved when a system can change its privacy policy depending on the user context [103] . Such systems may grant users added control over the collection of data by adapting privacy preferences to the context without being intrusive for the user. Any privacy-preserving framework should be designed and implemented by considering the following requirements: (1) clear indication on what personal data will be collected and how the data will be used, (2) the level of privacy and fairness and understandable description of the privacy-preserving and fairnessaware mechanisms being used, (3) user-friendly application programing interface, simplicity and practical feasibility of the mechanisms, (4) personalized privacy, and (5) contextaware privacy. This complex assembly of legal and technical components implementing the above requirements should be realized within the privacy-by-design [104] framework. By guiding software developers to apply inherent solutions to achieve better privacy and fairness, the privacy-by-design approaches enhance the value of privacy as a human right, fairness as proportional equality, and grounds our enthusiasm for digital technology within the parameters of user control.
By reviewing state-of-the-art developments of privacypreserving and fairness-aware methods and solutions, this paper argues that the best approach towards privacy protection is by implementing privacy-by-design frameworks, taking into account various trade-offs between privacy and utility, different notions of fairness, and privacy and efficacy of the mechanisms ensuring privacy and fairness. Thus, any tool for privacy protection should indicate what personal data will be collected and how the data will be used and the level of privacy and fairness including description of the privacy-preserving and fairness-aware mechanisms being used. Personalized privacy and context-aware privacy can also be considered as approaches towards enhancing citizens' involvement in various data collected applications. Whether these solutions should be designed to assist individuals' privacy and security choices with soft paternalistic interventions that nudge users towards more beneficial choices, is a question that could also be addressed. Recently, Acquisti et al. 2017 [105] discusses ''potential benefits of those interventions, highlights their shortcomings, and identifies key ethical, design, and research challenges''. Moreover, policy makers should seek to learn more about the implementation of automated decision-making systems in order to ensure that existing laws and legal frameworks for privacy protection are effectively implemented in response to the challenges posed by automated decision making algorithms in the various spheres of their applications.
As a final note, legal and technical concepts of privacy can be integrated by considering methods from Artificial Intelligence (AI). The AI and Law communities have converged on modelling legal norms and guidelines using logic and other formal techniques [106] . Several Legal XML standards were proposed to describe legal texts with XML-based rules (RuleML, SWRL, RIF, LKIF, etc.) [107] . Moreover, the Semantic Web, in particular Legal Ontology research combined with semantic norm extraction based on Natural Language Processing [108] , gave a great impulse to the modelling of legal concepts. An otology is specification of a representational vocabulary for a shared domain of discourse, definitions of classes, relations, functions, and other objects. Legal ontology thus aims to model law concepts through the formalization of norms, guidelines, and legal reasoning [109] - [111] . A privacypreserving framework should, therefore, consider the information in compliance with regulatory legal frameworks through the conceptualization of classes, relations, properties and instances pertaining to the problem domains of data protection and algorithm fairness. There exists a substantive amount of works on law and semantic languages, RDF and legal ontologies in OWL modelling interoperability and reasoning [112] - [114] . Law and policies are subject to contextual and dynamic interpretation across different jurisdictions, legal systems and policy environments [36] . In a privacy-preserving framework, privacy and fairness should be implemented to ensure the compliance with a country legal system and the proactive adoption of fairness and privacy [113] .
V. CONCLUSIONS
Recent developments in statistics and computer sciences have enabled computers interpret and analyze data automatically, making them active subjects in the knowledge discovery and decision making processes. The majority of the data now being generated by electronic devices and computers is for consumption by other computers. This, in turn, has scaled decision-making processes: it is becoming increasingly common for a computer to make decisions. The shift from humans towards automated decision-making processes has raised a multitude of issues ranging from the costs of incorrect decisions to ethical and privacy issues. Not surprisingly, these issues have recently been addresses by scholars in several disciplines, including social science, law, public policy, and computer science [115] .
As algorithms are increasingly used for decisions, the social, ethical, and legal values converted in these decision-making processes are the subject of increasing study, with privacy and fairness being the main concerns. Different notions of fairness and levels of privacy have been suggested, showing how to design accountable algorithms with a concrete privacy/utility tradeoff and when it is ethical and legal to use a sensitive attribute (such as gender or race) in machine learning systems. In general, scientists approach trust and assurance of computer systems differently than policymakers, seeking strong formal guarantees or trustworthy digital evidence that a system works as it is intended to or complies with a rule or policy objective rather than simple assurances that a piece of software acts in a certain way [87] .
The concept of privacy differs among cultures and individuals, and changes in time. Enserink and Chin [116] in the special issue of the journal Science on privacy, conclude: ''from big data to ubiquitous internet connections, technology empowers researchers and the public, but makes traditional notions of privacy obsolete.'' Privacy as we have known has ended. Nevertheless, it will remain a subject of intense philosophical, political, legal, and technical research in the years to come. Although data privacy laws and bills exist in 120 counties, they substantially differ between each other. In particular, there exist fundamental structural, constitutional and practical legal differences between EU and the US data protection legislation. Moreover, as already discussed, there is a notable tension among scholars and practitioners regarding the right to be forgotten. Without giving a detail account on this controversy, we finish this article by quoting Rosen: ''So if there are to be remedies for the problem of digital forgetting, my sense is that the most promising ones involve technology and norms and not law'' [117] . It seems that the best approach towards addressing this concern is by implementing privacy-by-design framework, taking into account differential privacy, various trade-offs between privacy and utility, different notions of fairness, and privacy and efficacy of the mechanisms ensuring privacy and fairness.
